Kann die evolutionäre Spieltheorie die Entstehung von Kooperation erklären? (Studie über die Schwächen eines formalen Ansatzes)



Kann die evolutionäre Spieltheorie die Entstehung von Kooperation erklären? (Studie über die Schwächen eines formalen Ansatzes)



Autor: Eckhart Arnold

Datum: 25.5.2005


Zusammenfassung:

Computer models of evolutionary game theory have in the last 20 or 30 years been widely used to study such phenomena as cooperation and reciprocal altruism. However, the scientic value of these models remains often rather doubtful. In this paper I try to demonstrate (by examining several examples) that these models are often indeed empirically imprecise and theoretically shallow. Furthermore, I try to answer why these models often fail and, finally, what requirements a model must meet if it is to be of any explanatory relevance.

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